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THE PR I N ' I PLES
of the
LAW OF NEGLIGENCE"
and the
MODERN DECISIONS UPON THE LIABILITY OF A
MUNICIPAL'CORPORATION FOR ITS DEPFCTIVE STREETS.
0
1 Naruse.
Cornell, University
School of Law.
1889.
Justice Alderson in the matter of Blyth V Birmingham Water CO.
defined the law of negl-ience which has frequently been cited in the
sLusequent cases as a high author-ti upon the subject, but this is
open to a criticism of Dr. Wharton who while admitting its correct-
ness so far as it excludes the accidents from thei.:catewory of negli-
Igence, objects to its undue extension to include with in it all,
important acts; he also deniesAustir's definition on the groUmd
that it is too broad and is founded on neither Roman nor common law
principles.
The difficulty in RivinR a precise and technical defi -iticn of !
it, lies or the fact that it must preclude many acts and nmissions
which do not violate ary leal obli ation as well, as many others
whi -h do.
Indeed many attempts were made by jurists to define the law,
none of which seems to be satisfactory to me; none of them have in
fact Proved a satisfaction to the framers of other definitions.'
4[21
Parrot V Wells Fargo & Co. 5 Wall 524
Kerwhocker V C. C. & C R. Co. 3 Ohio 172
Brown V Congress St. R. Co. 49 Mich. 153
'Heavens V Pender L. R. Co. 11 0. B. Div. 507.
Blyth V Birmingham W. Co. 11 Ex, 781
Pbila R.Co.' V Steinger 78 P. St. 225
Railroad Co V Johns 95 U.S. 442
Kent Com. Vol. II 560.
In view of this fact I do not assume to offer a perfect defi-
inition; but hope that the reader:.by a comparative study of it and
othersthat have been framed and cited above, may be aided in devel~op
ling another and better definition.
The definition:-,I offer is tbis,
Neglience to be actionable at law must be an unintentional
omission of a legalA duty to the injury of the plaintiff or his prop-
erty by a responsible person. To -ftel in using reasonable care,
diligence and skill which a person of ordinary prudence under, the
similar circumstances would exercised tis negligence; this negli-
gence may consistr either of an act or an omission.
With this definition then, there muut be first a duty without
[31
which there can be no negligence,
Carpenter V Aboes 81 N. Y. 21
Allen V Willard 57 Penn. St. 374
If one will assume to do or not to 0o a artain thing, he be-
icomes liable thereafter for the acts or omissions caused by it while
!he may not be liable for not assuming it; as for instance where a
town may be required to build a bridge and if even it had neglected,
'no individual: could maintain an action for it whilethe town may be
1i4able for not repairing itthereby causing an injury.
Penn. and Ohio Canal V Graham 63 Penn. State 290.
Bigelow on Torts p 260.
This duty implies.::to use care, W de skil 1i:or diligence
iin each particular case. The duty thus imposed must always be legal,
,one as contradistinauished from the moral, duty and the amoun.t of the
duty thus required need not to be more than the law requires; for
linstance it would be most common and unexcusable moral, obliqation
for a man if he sees a fire starting in a neighbor's house, to go
and assist them in putting:it down; but no human law requires it
as it will;.produce more harm than zood to inforce such a rule by an
action for damages.
In regard to the amount of the duty a respect must always be
had as to the particular circumstances of the case and the progress
of science, era. etc.
As to the first point, a driver who is under an obligation to
use ordinary care and diligence (n highways, must exercise most
scrupulous care if he drives through a crowd or a person passing on
the wrong side of a street must use something more than ordinary
care while he is only rejuired to use ordinary-care if he passes th
right side of the street.
6mith on Negligence, p 23.
O s to the progress of the science and era, many acts or omiss-
ions are now evidence of gross negligence which a few years ago
would not have been culpable, as many acts are now consistant with
great care and skill which in a few years will be considered to be
the heighth of imprudence.
Thus the introduction of the Steam Engine has made it necessary
that more care should often be used in the management of horses than
iwas formerly necessary.
In Cleveland V Spier the defendants servant was employed in
drilling a hole into a gas main ir a thoroughfare, using for the
purpose a 'Diamond point" chisel, which caused particles.of iron
to fly off, and thereby endangers passer-by. A less dangerous mode
of d oing the work would have been by drilling or screeing; a piece
of iron was chipped off and struck the plaintiff in the eye, and
injured him.
It was held that the fact that the accident would have been
avoided by drilling or screeinR was evidence of negligence; and therE
fore that the defendant was liable.
Cleveland V. Spiers 16 C. B. N S 399.
But amount of such duty may be imposed and fixed by statute in
some cases; as for instance regulating the speed of vehicles or
trains.
St. Louis R. R. Co. V Matbias 50 Ind. 65.
Penn. Co. V Conlon 101 Ill. 93.
Beisiegel V N.Y. Cent. R. R. Co. 14 Abb N. S. 29.
Or special warning to be given at. their aproach.
Lane V Atlantic Works 1-11 Mass. 13.
The violation of such statute may be a prima faci:conclusive
videnze of negidgence and a suit .may be instituted as a basis of the
ction.
(6)
Carroll, V Statin Island R. R. 6o. 58 N. Y. 126.
'One who is personally bound to do a duty canmot delegate it to an-
other to releive himself and the fact that he has used utmost care
Ito select the servant would not, excuse him, for instance, where a
imunicipal corporation is required to repair its streets and if any
injury willt occur to a third person by negligence of the selected
employee it will nevertheless be liable.
Storrs-V Utica 17 N. Y. 104
Another important element of negligence is the absence of a
n.distnct intetion to produe the Injury to distinguish from fraud.
INow lastly there must be a damage to the plaintiff and it must be
ispecial, to him; he has no right of action individually if he has
suffered no specialwrong. That is no. damage other than every member
:of the community has suffered in equal measure.
P R0X IMATE .AUSE.
The breech of the duty and not merely his act, must be the
1cause of the plaintiff's damage.
Dickey V Maine Telegraph Co. 4. Maine 492.
Crandall V Goodrich 0o. 16 Fed. Rep. 75.
The mere fact that the defendant has been guilty of negligence
foliowed by an aot~rr does not make him liable for the resulting
(ion
injury unless that was occasionedby the.negligence and the connigot-'
of the cause and effect must, be always established.
Chicage etc. R. R. Co. V Corrolli 12 I1l. 643.
The proximity of the cause and effect is alwayu a test of the
liability of the defendant.
Where on the face of a complaint, in an action for negligence,
it appears that the negligence charged was not the-pproximate cause
of the injury, the complaint P bad anfi-r.
Scheffer V R. R. Co 105 U. S. 249.
As to'the natural, and continuous sequences of tortuous negil'
gence it has been held on one hand that he willbe held responsible'
Ifor whatever wrong he-might have caused or omitted ignoring the fact
,whether he has anticipated it or not.
BennittV LOckwood 20 Wend. 223.
Philip V Diokerson 85 Il,11.
Lake V. Millwaukee 62 Maine 240.
Ghrgott, V N. Y. 96 N. Y. 264.
On the other hand, it has been held that he should not be held
Iresponsible for any act which, in the exercise of reasonable fore-'
I
(8)
: sight, he could not foresee.
Sharp V Powell L. R. 7 C. P. 253.
But the middle ground seems to have been also taken between
ithose two schools.
Oerhard V Bates 2 Ellis & B. 490.
Wharton on Negligence. Sec. 16. 74. and on.
Better and general rule is, that. a man is answerseL for the
Iconsequences of a fault which are naturali and probable; but if his
fault happens to occur with something extraordinary and unforseen,
he will, not be liable.
The maxim, oausa proxima non remota speclantur, means this;
ione engaged in an act~which the circumstances indicate may be danger-
aiS to others, and the events whose occurrercE! is necessary to
,make the act injurious, can be readily seen as likely to occur under
'these circumstances, the defendant is liable if he does not take all
%
the care which prudence would suggest to avoid injury.
McGraw V Stone 53 P. State. 436.
Any intervening cause of another person to the injury that is
if a third person has concurred or cooperated in the act, is no
excuse to the defendant's liability, if the cause is distinctly
I (9)
seperable as in case where he had contributed his negligence to the
act of God.
But such intervening act will be an excuse if it is inevitable
,without, any wrong on his part although he will be liable if he had
,contributed to the intervention as where the defendant leaves a horse
loose and unattended, in a city street, is responsible for-injury
done by the horse in running away, althought might not have happened
but for the malicious act of a stranger in frightening it.
Lynch V Nurdin Q. B. 29.
So also where the Defendant left his cart in the street unattend
l1,;ed, and while so standing another cart came in collision with it,
in consequence of which the plaintiff was injured, it was held that
the defendant was liable.
Powell V Deveny 3 Cushing 300.
D E G R EE 0 F N E G L I G E N C E.
Dr. Wharton in his celebrated work on the Law of Negligence
after careful examination of the .Roman law and the opinion of-Mr.
Mommsen, conclusively has laid down two theories of degree of negli-
g ience.
First,- Culpa Lata iLg. ignorance of that which every ordinary
(10)
1person knows; this is to be required by one who is not, and does not
profess to be, a good man of business or an expert in the affairs
under consideration.
Second,-' Culpa Levies or the Culpa which exists when a person
bo'kd to a special:duty neklects to enter upon and discharge it
witb the diligence belOnging to a Diligens. Bonus. Studios pater-'i
familes. This bonus pater familas he declares, is entirely different
from the English paterfamilas which was considered to be merely
a domestic father the Roman pater familas was a man of high respon-
sibilities over tribes and his children; Wielding, therefore, poss-
essions and prerogatives the due management of which required a pe1
culiar sagacity eto, hence Roman pater familas was emminently the
men of affairs.
Great care, he continues, should not be demanded in any case
if it. is taken for granted that the defendant has been in the exer-'
cise of due care and diligence which are to be expected from the
person in the same line of business, under similar circumstances.
He expressly admits however that this theory of two degrees
is in conflict with judicial decisions.
In the case of IngalltV Bill 9 Met, the plaintiff and several-
(11)
other parties took the outside seats, as passengers, on the top of
the defendant's coach, to be conveydd from Boston to Cambridge; andI
on the way, while passing at a moderate rate-, and without coming in
contact with anything, or meeting any obstruction, hind axeltree of
the coach settled down on one side, without being overset and by
jumping upon the pavement from the top of the coach, be was injured.
Held that the proprietors of coaches, who carry passengers for hire,
are answerable to a passenger for an injury which happens by reason
of any defect in the coach, which might have been discovered by the
most careful, and thorough examinations, etc.
But Dr. Wharton gives a qualification upon this particular case
saying that the defendant was required to use that degree of care
a
and skill which good sptcialist skilled in his particular department,
is accustomed to apply and if be has done so, he would not have
been liable and according to Dr. Wharton, the theory of classifyin1
the care into three degrees, is only a product of mere speculation
iof abstract principle without the aid of practical,:experience.:.by
the student of the middle ages and therefore at present only two
degrees are necessary, which we may call slight and ordinary care.
This theory might have been Looked upon with some favor "when,
(12)
to quote ShermQn and Redfield, it would hae seemed preposterous to
claim a greater degree of care for the preservation of the life of
a slave than for the statute of an emperor." But as the modern
regard for human life became more sacred than property; and side by
side with the growth of this feeling, there has been a wonderful
!extension of human powers by means of new invntions':and the courts:
]of the United States and of Great Britain have felt the vital neces-
sity.of a special and.:unusual degree of care and not content with
that great care and diligence for which the liability for slight
tregLdgence is a reward, they have actually invented the fourth de-
gree of care or the uttermost care and the responsibility for the
islightest negligence.
It is now a well settled rule in the United States that the
carrier of persons is responsible for any injury arising from any
!defect in the cars etc. which could have been discovered by any
known test, either while Thuse-or in the process of manufacture.
Costello V Binghamton etc. F. F. Co. 65 Barb 92.
Stenweg V Erie R. R. Co. 43 N. Y. 123.
Higerman V Western R. R. Co. 13 N. Y. 9.
In several cases it was held that the common carrier is bound
(1$)
to accept all inventions which tended to the safety of the passenger
and which are in use by some of the carriers.
Meir V Pean. R. R. Co. 64 Penn. State 225.
Knight V Portland R. R. Co. 56 Maine 234.
Also common carrier of persons is bound to use the higbept de-
ree of prudence and in some cases utmost care and diligence.
Smith V N. Y. Cent. R. P. Co. 24 N. Y. 222.
Greatest,care and purdence required
Houston, etc. R. R. Co. Gorbett 49 Texas 573.
Now after careful examinations of the recent cases of the law
of common carrier of persons, we will be compelled to affirm the
fourth class of care proposed or utmost care in addition to the
three classes which are generally observed.
Those three classes may fairly be defined as follows:-
I. Slight care is that, whicb persons of less than common pru-
dence, or indeed of any prudence at all, take of their own concerns.
Story cn Bailment sec. 16.
I. Ordinary care is that degr,(e -Gddiligence which men in gen-
'eral exert in respect to their own concerns under similar circum-
stances. ditto.I1
(14)
III. High or great care is of course'extraordinary diligence,
or that, which very prudent persons take of their own concerns .dittc
But -He-i-r have b-een many cases decided throwing some doubt of
the practicability of applications of these cleases. Thus Denmon,
C. J., doubted whether any intelligable distinction could be alade
"between grots negligence and negligence merely".
Hitton V Diffin 2 0. B. 646. and this remark was cited by
Smith, J. in Perkin V. N. Y. C. R. Co. 24 N. Y. 196. and also in
Wilson V Brett, 11 Meeson Wekey 113, Baron Rolf declared be could
see no difference between negligence and gross negligence; that it
was the same thing, with the addition of a vituperative epithet;
also Mr. Justice Story says "indeed, what is common or ordinary
diligence is mere a matter of fact than of law. Story on Bailment
see 11
THE MODERN DECISIONS UPON TH LItBILITY OF A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION
FOP ITS DEFECTIVE STREETS-
Before enterina into a discussion of this topic we mrist in the
first place understand the precise distinction between municipkl
corporations proper and quasi corporations as to which latter there
(15)
are
is almost an entire uniformity of decisions that they never liable'
to a private person for any injuries occasioned by defective roads
and bridges under their control, as public agencies, unless positive-
ly so declared and as Mr. Dillon has said there is no common law
obligation upon quati corporatiors to repair highways, streets, etc .
and they are not obliged unless by the virtue of statute.
This statement is very well adjudicated in the state of I1.
In the matter of Hedges V Madison Co. one Gillman 56. it was
held that the counties-nie-r not liable to a private action for de-
fective highways, and subsequently in case of Browning V Springfieli
17 Ill 1143. it was held to be otherwise as respects charter cities
or ordinarF municipal corporations.
But thi.E distinction is ignored in Indiana since the case of
Otave V Fort Wayne, 45 Ind. 429. holding a town liable for damages
caused to travellers by reason of its defective streeis in spite of
'there being no statute making it liable. The liability, says the
court "grows out of the power conferred upon city over its streets
and bridges and its duty to feep Lbew in reasonable repair, having
the power to raise WRpans for thatpurpose."
House V Montgomery 00 ind. 580.
(16)
This view seems to have also been followed in some of the states
and we will find not much difficulty in holding the corporation
liable on the general principals of law although there may not be
ja statute fixing the liability for its neglect to repair the streets
I
etc. thereby causing injury, if they were provided with enough funds.
It was held in New York that the absence of necessary funds, i
1:or the legal, means of prucuring them will exquse the perfornance of,:
duty.
Hines V Lockport 50 N. Y 23C.
Thus having examined briefly the present condition of the
Idistinctions observed by different courts as to municipal corporat-I
ions and qnhasi corporations, while in some states as in Indiana,
the distinction is discarded, I shall proceed to consider first
their duty to repair.
D U T Y TO ,E P A I R.
It is generally held as we have seen that an action cannot be
[aintaindd against aounties or parishes, unless authorized by statu-
;tes for damages sustained through their neglect to keep the bridges
and highways in repair, although the duty of doing so is clearly
enjoined upon them by law, and they have authority to collect taxes,
(17)
or make adequate avsessments.
oronger Pulaski Co. 26 Ark. 37-
To the same effect that if there is no statute authorizing
individuals to maintain the stit for injuries received n acco.tnt 6f
the defect of the streets, there is no remedy.
City of Arkadelphia V Windom 4. S. W. 450.
Pomfrey V Villege of Saratoga 11 N. E. 43.
Sheridan V City of Salem 12 P. 925.
Albert V Johnson Co. 16 N. 654.
The above decisions are radically contradicted. City of Baulddr
V. Niles 12 P- 632.
In the matter of the City of Denver V Dunsmore 3. P. Rep. 705
the chief Justice Beck came to the following conclusion:
"Tbe- general current of authority supports the view
that when municipal corporations are invested with exclusive authorH
ity and control over the streets and bridges within their corporat
limits, with ample power of raising,:4oney for their construction,
improvements , and repair, the duty raises to the public, from the
nature of the power pranted, to keep the avenues of travel within
their jurisdiction in a reasonably safe condition for the ordinary
(1e)
[mode of use to which they are suojected, corresponding liability
rests upon the corporation to responding damages to those injured
by neglect to perform the duty: that the same rule obtains in such
case whether the duty specifically imposed bytbe act of incorpora-
tion or not.
This holding seems to be entirely opposite to that of Justice
Battle, J. in Arcadelphia V Windhom before cited.
If such duty to keep the streets, bridges and highways in
reasonable condition is imposed upon the corporation with the accepit-
lance of a charter giving the coqmon councils power to protect streelts
against defects, etc., it cannot escape the liability because the
auxilliary powers and duties are subsequently bhonferred by act of
.legeslature upon the police department.
Kunz Administrators, Etc. V City of Troy 10 N. R. 442.
not
It is the duty of a municipal corporation to keep every street
safe throughout its entire width regardless of location,- amount of
travels and other circumstances.
Fulliam V City of Muscatine 30 N. WIk. 86.
But this is contradicted in 3Xrrell, V Uncapher 11 At. Rep. 619
holding that a township owes a duty to the public to keep a reason-
(19)
ably safe road at any given place, and if an injury occurs from itsi
failure so to do,, it is responsible for its negligence.
The duty to keep in safe condition also extends to sidewalk
D;ooley V Town of Sullivan 14 N. F. 566.
'HPT ,2ONSTITOdT S DEDICATION AND ACCEPTANCE.
To constitute a strip of land, laid out as a street, by the
,.proprietor of a tract of land, a public highway, by force of a dtd-
,'I
iication for that purpose, the dedication must be accepted by the prlo-
per authorities, or there must be a user of the street as a highway.
BisseldP N. Y. C. R. P. Co. 26 Barb. 650. or a way may be ded - '
ticated by the owner of the land as such, and if it will be laid out
tas such by the constituted authorities it will o;ecome a legal high-
.way, and also if it was used for an uninterrupted twenty years by
lpublic, it will have tie same effect.
The trustee of Jordan V Otis 37 Barb. 50. andKennedy V City
'of Cumberland 9 A. 23,1.
3ut the rule requiring the twenty years use to establish a high-
way by user, does not apply to highways created by dedication; then
[the intention of the owner, rather than the length of the user,
determines the question.
(20)
State V Marble 4 Ired. L. 318 such intent must be always proved
Remongton V Millard I R. I. 93. mere acquiescence on the part of the
'i;'ownee of the property does not create the presumption of dedication'
Hoole V A torney General 22 Ala. 190.
It is conlusively shown to be a highway, by proof that it has
b, been knoiin and used as a highway for 40 years and during that time
has been repaired by the town in which it js situated.
James Reed V Northfield 13 Pick. 94.
But in the case of Noyes V Ward 19 Conn. it was held that in
',order to establish in the public a right to the use of land of the
higbhway, by dedication, it is not requisite tbat they should have
used it as suab for the period of-fifteen years, nor that tbe'public
,use should have been adverse and uninterrupted.
In the state where there is no statutes authorizing the towns
+n aecept a'lend by dedication, it must always be governed by the
, common law principles which recognize it as a gift and estop the
giver from recalLing it and presume an acceptance by the public
where the highway is shown to be of common convenience and necessit
and therefore benlficili 'to them.
The principal, evidence of its beneficial character will be the I
(21)
actual use of it as a public highway without objection by those
who have occasion to use it; in such case reasonable time must
be allowed for acceptance.
Gutblie V New Haven 31 Conn 308.
If an incorporated company within the limit of a town lay outl
a road and dedicate it to the public, the town would not thereby
become liable to repair, unless it has in some way acicepted or
adopted as a way.
Bryant V Bidderford 9 Wis. 193.
To the same effect, in the case of Durgin and wife V City of
Lowell it was held that & way constructed and kept in repair by a
private corporation upon its own land for its own use and conven-
ience of tenants occupying its houses on both sides therof, opening
in the public street, having a sign "Private Way" upon the corner
but left open to public travelfor more than twenty years without
interruption is not thereby dedicated to the publ-ic; nor does it
become a highway by prescription.
No 0 T I C -F F D F  C.T.
Notice of a defect is notice of that condition of things whic1
constitute a defect, although the authority of town may think that
(22)
it does not constitute effect and any conversations about an acci-
dent or a defect in a highway, between persons, none of them is an
officer of the town, are not competent evidence to show notice to
the town of such defect, altbouh the conversation may have been
had between many different persons.
Hinckley V Somerset 14 N. E. 16
But it is no error to charge it to the jury the fact that the
accident in front of a police station, and within sight of the offi-
cers whose duty it was to have charge of the station.
Osborn V City of Detroit 32 F. 36. See also Dowling V West
Morlend -52 N. H. 401. Dongan T Transportation Co. 56 N. Y. 7.
Notice may be inferred where defect had existed for such a
preasonable time that the county by the exercise of reasonable care,
"migbht have discovered them.
Howard V Legg 11 N. E. 612.
Also as a supervisor of roads is agent of the county within
.its district, what he may know of such defect in the dildgent dis-
charge of t duties of his office he has notice of, and the county
!'also.
Eastermann V Clackamas 32 F. 24.
(23)
But notice in the name of nobody, is no notice.
Rogers V Hoskins 14 Ga. 169
In regard to tbe lengtl of time of notice to be giv4n, it was
held in Houston V Issac 3 N. W. 693 that the provision in a city
charter exempting the corporation from liability to any person for
damages caused oy a street being out of repair through the gross
negligence of the corporation, unless the same shall have remained
so for ten days after special rotice in writing to the mayor or
street commisioner, does not apply where the city having put a con-'
tractor to work upon the street, and after be had con-menced to work
and made an excavation in the street, rendering it unsafe for travel,
discharged him and left the work in an unfinished condition and the
e
plaintiff may recover if he receivs any injury although he has not
given a notice of ten days.
Where a person falls into a hole which was left by the work-
ingmen unguarded when they have left the work and the municipal
authority had no notice after one hour and forty five minutes, thJe
will not be liable for injury.
Warsow V Dunlap 14 N. E. 568.
C(ONTR!BUTORY NGLIGMOE AS DEFENCE.
(24)
It is now too well settled, to approve by cases, for saying
that one whose own negligence contributing to the injuries complain-
ed of, in conjunction with a defect in highway, will bar his right
of action, also to satisfy our purpose for the present it siEems
* hardly necessary to enter into any philosophical and technical argu-
ment upon the suoject, but I will presently examine the decisions
of the different states.
The cases cited below enable the author to say that the stand-'
a
ard of care demanded of travellers passing on highway is simply such
as a person of common prudence would exercise under the similar
circumstances.
Simms V S. C. R. R. Co. 3 3 0 SO1.
Morrell V Peck CI V. Y. 322.
"oufe V Tulton 29 Wis. 29r.
ilespie V Newburah 56 N. Y. 468.
Any traveller passing along a side-walk has the right to
assume that the city has performed its duty in keeping the walk in
safe and proper condition, and he is required to exercise only ordi-
nary care in passing over the place where the accident occurred,
unless he knows of its dan"erous condition, or might have seen it
(25)
by the exirci.e of ordinary care observed by citizens in working
along the side of the city; he is not required to anticipate a danger
nor to be on the look-out for its existance, and a degree of care and
caution required of the dangerous condition always depend upon his
knowledge concerning to such a defect.
Gordon V City of Richm~nd 2 S. E. 727.
Jamings V VanSchaick 1b N. t. 424.
The question is settled that the greater care is to oe expect-
ed from person of poor or defective sigbt, than persons of far sight;
Perch V Utice 10 Hun 477.
But no one, whatever his infirmies may be- is boLnd to use
extraordinary care; so a person, however he may be blind, has a right
to presume that the highway is reasonably safe and fit for travell-
inT.
It was held in Sinitb V Wilds 143 Mass. 556 that it cannot be
laid down as a universal rule that it is negligence for a blind
man to walk the streets unattended; this fact taken in connection
'with his habit of oin- about alone, and his acquaintance with the
locality, must be considered by jury;
It is also said that the plaintiff is not guilty of contrib-
(26)
utory negligence because he was driving a bl-ind horse on a dark nighi
Brackenridge V Fitchburg 13 N. E. 457.
If no warning is made, it is not contributory negligence even
if he had fallen down in the daylight.
Cantwell V City of Appleton 37 N] W. 813. nor CroEsing tbrough
abstraction, is p -45d negligent, because obstruction is not
always dangerous.
Evansville etc. R. R. Co. V Carvener 14 N. E. 738.
Now in regard to the burden of proving the contributory negli-
gence on the part of the plaintiff after.,he made a fair presumptivr
case of defendants negligence, it is very well settled that it is
upon corporations or defendant to prove plaintiff's contributory
negligence.
Gordon V City of Richmond Supra.
Hopkins V Utah N. R. Co. 13 P. 343.
Huckshold V St. Louis I. M. and S. R. Co. 2 S. W. 794.
It was held that the falling of a building is a prime faci
inegligence on the part of the defendant and if he claims it to have
lb:een caused by an unavoidable cause, the burden of proof is shifted
on the defendant to show such.
(27)
Giles V Diamond State Iron Co. 31 N. W. 164.
Now lastly to maintain an action for injury, the plaintiff
must establish a specific defect alleged in the complaint in order
to recover damages.
Armstrong V Ackley 32 N. W. 180.
It was held in Wisconsin where the statute requires rOtice to
a town injuries from insufficient highways shall state the place
I
I where such damages occurred, describing-VeneralIly the insufficiency
or want of repair which occasioned it,- a notice which specificaldy
describes the location of the place of the injury, but designates
the place a. oridoe is su"fifient, though the evidence shows it to
be a culvert.
'all V Highland Supra. It is here held that not to be neces-
sary to allege in action negligently doing an act whimb resulted
in doing an actual injury; or the fact which contributed to the
primary act complained of.
Davis V Guarmeri 15 N. F. 350.
A question incidentally comes whether the injured person could
maintain an action for injury received in Sunday against a munici-
!pal corporation; there have been many cases decided and the point of
(28)
difference upon the decisions being whether it is necessary to
allee that the plaintiff was engaged in a worK of necessity, etc.
In Mass.,,- Maine, and Vermont general travel on highway on
Jnday is prohibited and t e plaintiff cannot maintair an action
against municipal corporations unless be will show that be has been
engaged in the work, of QG or charity.
Reed V boston etc. P. R. Co. 4 N. F. 227.
Hall V Ripley 119 Mass.135.
Hyde Park V Gray 120 Mass. 589.
Lyons V Desotelle 124 Mass. 387.
Tillock V Webb 56 Maine. 1CC
3 oco t y V 3unzar b7 A-aine 42'.
0'Cornell V Lewiston T-D' "jaine 34.
But it ,-as held that wCrKing for exercise in the openair on
Shunday is not a violation of the statute.
Hinckloy 1. ?cnobse 42 X.aine £.
But this application of the Sunday law has been repudiated by
almost all- other states.
In Idaho Supreme J]ourt that where an injury occurs to the
plaintiff on the Sabbath day through the negligence of the defendant
(29)
in not keeping its street in proper condition, the plaintiff is not
required to show that he was engaged in a work of necessity at the
time of the accident in order to entitle him to recover.
Black V City of Lewistown 1 5. 80.
?lotz 7 Cohoes 2 , L. Y. 21P.
Qorroll V S. I. P. Co. 3- . Y. I9?.
Piollet V Simmer VOc Pst. 95
Smith V N' .Y.S.&c R. Co. 46 N. J. L. 7.
Wentworth V Joferson 6D N. H. 158
.TcThur V G. Boy R. Co. 34 Wis. 139.
Knowlton V Milwaukee & Co. 5P is. 278.
Lewisville etc. R. Co. V Frawley 9. N. E. (08 Ind.) 594
Schmid V Eumphrey 4P Iowa e52.
Commonwealth V L-ewisville R. Co. 80 KY. 291.
Armstrong V Taler 11 Wheat. 2'8.
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